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Abstract
During the 2008-2009 crisis, trade in goods fell by almost 30%. In contrast, trade
in business, telecommunication and financial services continued growing at their
pre-crisis rates and only services related to transport declined. Using trade data
at the firm-product-destination level for Belgium, I show that during the crisis
the elasticity of services exports with respect to GDP growth in destination
countries was significantly different from that of goods exports. In particular,
the negative income shock in partner countries affected exports of goods but
not exports of services. This difference is economically sizable: if goods exports
had had the same elasticity to GDP growth as services exports, their fall during
the 2008-2009 collapse would have been only half what was observed.
Keywords: Trade Collapse, Service Resilience, Trade in Services and Goods.
1. Introduction
Between the third quarter of 2008 and the second quarter of 2009, trade in
goods experienced the steepest decline ever recorded, with both exports and
imports dropping four times more than income (Freund, 2009; Levchenko et al.,
2010). The fall was severe, highly synchronized across countries and mostly5
concentrated in the category of durable goods (Baldwin, 2009). During this
period, trade in services remained stable. Business, telecommunication and
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financial services, which constitute more than half of trade in services in modern
economies, continued growing at their pre-crisis rates and only the category of
transport services declined. This different reaction is hard to explain based10
on the existing literature. Most of the studies analyzing trade in services at
the micro level suggest that trade in services shares many of the characteristics
of trade in goods without any noticeable difference.2 Moreover, while a large
number of papers have attempted to understand the causes of the “Great Trade
Collapse” (Baldwin, 2009) for trade in goods,3 the distinctive resilience of trade15
in services did not garner attention in the international trade literature.4
Using firm-product-destination5 export data for Belgium, I show that ser-
vices and goods exports experienced a different elasticity with respect to GDP
growth in destination countries during the 2008-2009 crisis. In particular, the
negative income shock in foreign markets affected exports of goods (especially20
exports of durable goods), but did not perturb the growth of services exports.
This means that the main factor behind the trade in goods collapse (Behrens
et al., 2011; Bricongne et al., 2012; Eaton et al., 2015; Levchenko et al., 2010) did
not have any effect on trade in services. This difference is economically impor-
tant: if goods exports had had the same elasticity to GDP growth as services,25
their fall during the 2008-2009 collapse would have been only half what was
observed. The composition of exports and GDP helps understanding the differ-
ent elasticity. Exports are predominantly composed of durable goods, which is
the product category that dropped the most during the crisis (Behrens et al.,
2011; Levchenko et al., 2010). Instead, GDP is mostly composed of services and30
consumable goods, which remained relatively stable during the crisis (Borchert
2Breinlich & Criscuolo (2011) for the UK, Kelle & Kleinert (2010) for Germany, Walter
& Dell’mour (2010) for Austria, Gaulier et al. (2011) for France, Federico & Tosti (2012) for
Italy, and Ariu (2015) for Belgium.
3See Baldwin (2009), Bems et al. (2013) and Levchenko et al. (2010) for a review.
4Borchert & Mattoo (2009) is the only exception.
5For the sake of expositional clarity, I use the expression “product” also when referring to
a service.
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& Mattoo, 2009; Francois & Woerz, 2009). Thus, exports of goods over-reacted
with respect to the negative GDP shock in destination countries, while exports
of services did not.
The empirical analysis proceeds in three steps. In the first, I provide de-35
scriptive evidence on how exporters reacted to the crisis. I decompose over-time
changes in exports, separately for goods and services, into changes in the exten-
sive and intensive margins.6 In the second step, I use a difference-in-difference
approach similar to Behrens et al. (2011) to explore the effect of GDP growth in
partner countries on exports of goods and exports of services separately. I com-40
pare the change of firm-country-product exports between the first six months of
2007 and 2008 (pre-treatment outcome) with the change between the first six
months of 2008 and 2009 (post-treatment outcome). In the third step, I put
together the information on goods and services exports and perform a triple-
difference analysis to understand the magnitude and statistical significance of45
the role played by GDP growth for services exports with respect to goods ex-
ports during the crisis. I compare changes in services exports with changes in
goods exports using only firms that export both goods and services. Moreover,
I complement the within-firm results with evidence on cross-firm effects. More
specifically, I use propensity score matching to find for each service exporter the50
closest goods exporter and apply to the matched firms the same triple-difference
strategy.
Borchert & Mattoo (2009) is the first paper to show that services did not
collapse during the crisis of 2008-2009. Using aggregate US trade data, they
show that both exports and imports of services did not decline. Then, using55
data on Indian exporters in the IT sector, they suggest that services did not
6The extensive margins consist of the average number of partner-countries per firm and
the average number of products exported per firm-country. The intensive margin consists of
the average exports per firm, country and product. Due to data limitations explained in the
next section, I cannot analyze entry and exit dynamics. I restrict my analysis to within-firm
adjustments, focusing on the firms that were observed continuously during the crisis.
3
suffer from the 2008-2009 crisis because their demand is less cyclical and they
rely less on external capital. The main contribution of this paper is to go be-
yond their descriptive evidence and provide a micro-econometric analysis of the
determinants of the different response of trade in goods and trade in services60
during the “Great Trade Collapse”. Moreover, by using very disaggregate ex-
port data, this paper complements the evidence present in Borchert & Mattoo
(2009) with an analysis of the within-firm dynamics of trade margins during the
crisis. Finally, this paper brings the trade in services perspective into the large
literature analyzing the effect of macroeconomic shocks on trade in goods at the65
firm-level,7 especially to the papers focusing on the 2008-2009 crisis.8
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data; Section 3
presents the descriptive statistics; Section 4 presents the difference-in-difference
analysis; Section 5 develops the triple-difference approach; and Section 6 con-
cludes.70
2. Data Description
The bulk of the data used in this paper is composed of three different datasets
provided by the National Bank of Belgium (NBB) concerning trade in services,
trade in goods and firm-level accounts.
Data on trade in services come from the NBB Trade in Services dataset used75
to compile the balance of payments and cover the period from 2006 to 2010. The
dataset is formed using different surveys conducted by the NBB9 and contains
information about trade in services at the firm-destination-product level. For
any firm present in the dataset is available monthly or quarterly information
(depending on the survey) on export values per type of product and destination80
country. Service products are listed in Table 2 of the Online Appendix and
7such as Bernard et al. (2009), Amiti & Weinstein (2011) and Iacovone & Zavacka (2009).
8See Baldwin (2009), Bems et al. (2013) and Levchenko et al. (2010) for recent reviews.
9For more information on the surveys, see Table 1 in the Online Appendix available at
http://www.ariu.eu/Andrea_Arius_Web_Page/Research.html.
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countries are classified using ISO 2-digit codes.10 I exclude “services to affil-
iates” (code H7000) from the analysis because this category does not contain
information on which specific service is traded and “goods included in the con-
struction services” (code E0002) because it does not strictly represent trade in85
services.
After these cuts the dataset includes about 40% of Belgian exporters and
more or less 60% of total services exports by Belgium. It is structured to be
representative of all firms exporting services in terms of export size, exported
services, firm size and geographical dispersion of exports. The survey nature of90
the dataset rules out any analysis of entry and exit patterns in foreign markets.11
Therefore, the analysis in this paper will focus solely on the firms that are
continuously observed during the period of analysis.12 This means that I cannot
analyze across-firm adjustments, but I can still explore the service and product
margins, and thus within-firm adjustments during the crisis. This limitation95
should not too serious, since entry and exit account for less than 8% of total
exports for both goods and services in normal years (Ariu, 2015) and since
entry and exit represented a marginal channel of adjustment for firms during
the crisis (Behrens et al., 2011; Bricongne et al., 2012).13 Moreover, despite this
constraint, this is the only dataset available that allows for an analysis of trade100
in services at the firm-product-destination level during the 2008-2009 crisis.
10The ISO 2-digit classification includes about 250 countries. The datasets include 230 of
them.
11One problem is represented by the fact that the firms might be exporting before they get
into the data. Another one relates to the fact that when a firm enters the dataset, it is kept
for some years even if it does not meet the thresholds to be included any longer. Moreover,
even by excluding those firms by checking the conformity with the criteria, it would give an
idea of the entry into and exit from the survey, but it is questionable whether this would also
be representative of entry into and exit from export markets.
12These continuing firms account for about 96% of exports and imports present in the
surveys, so we can be confident that the data covers the bulk of Belgian trade.
13Bernard et al. (2009) show that also during the Asian crisis the extensive margin was a
minor adjustment channel and all the action was concentrated on the intensive margin.
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Information on trade in goods is taken from the NBB Trade in Goods
Dataset, which contains exports and imports of goods by Belgian firms at the
firm-destination-product level. The data are collected monthly and come from
the Intrastat (Intra-European) and the Extrastat (Extra-European) declara-105
tions. Firms are identified by their VAT number, countries are classified using
ISO 2-digit codes, and products are classified using 4-digit HS codes. Data on
firm-level accounts come from the Business Register covering the population of
firms required to file their (unconsolidated) accounts with the NBB. From this
dataset, I take information on full-time equivalent employment, turnover, oper-110
ating profits, equities, liabilities, stocks and purchases of intermediates for the
year 2007. Unfortunately, turnover figures comprise both goods and services to-
gether and there is no information available to distinguish between the two. This
prevents me from analyzing the dynamics of goods and services in the domestic
market. The multinational and foreign ownership status of firms is available115
from the NBB Survey of Foreign Direct Investments. Finally, I take informa-
tion on GDP growth in destination countries from the IMF World Economic
Outlook database (2012 version)14 and information on daily exchange rates on
the 1st of April of each year from the European Central Bank’s Statistical Data
Warehouse.15120
3. The Crisis in Figures
As previously mentioned, the crisis hit goods more severely than services.
Figure 1 shows that exports of goods (dashed line) fell by about 30% after
September 2008. Services instead (solid line) show no clear sign of discontinuity
and they exhibit similar growth patterns before and after September 2008. This125
phenomenon was not only confined to Belgium, but could be observed worldwide
and it was significant in terms of magnitude. In Figures 2 and 3, I plot the ratio
of quarterly exports of services over exports of goods for OECD countries, with
14Available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/01/weodata/index.aspx
15Available at: http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/
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the first quarter of 2006 normalized to one.16 Following the Lehman Brothers’
collapse in the third quarter of 2008, the increase in the ratio for Belgium -130
about 25%- is similar to that of the UK, the USA, Germany, and Mexico and is
in line with the average for the OECD. This pattern is particularly strong for
Canada, Austria, France, and Japan - for which an increase of about 40% can
be observed- while it is not clearly present only in very few countries (Australia,
Ireland, New Zealand, Greece, and Iceland).135
Figure 1: Belgian Monthly Exports, Jan. 2007=1
In the rest of the paper, the analysis will be focused only on the first six
months (S1) of each year -as also in Behrens et al. (2011)-. This choice is made
in order to i) reduce seasonality issues which are evident in the monthly data; ii)
include the maximum number of firms;17 and iii) do a clear pre-post comparison
avoiding the shock present in the statistics of the third and fourth quarters of140
2008. The first step towards understanding the composition of the changes in
Belgium’s exports is to decompose total Belgian exports at time t (where, in this
16Data come from the OECD database available at http://stats.oecd.org
17Some firms declare exports only quarterly and most firms export only once per year;
therefore, carrying out an analysis on continuing firms at the monthly or quarterly level
would reduce substantially the number of observations.
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Figure 2: Quarterly Ratio of Services
Goods
Exports, 2006Q1=1
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Figure 3: Quarterly Ratio of Services
Goods
Exports, 2006Q1=1
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Table 1: Change in the Margins of Belgian Exports (2008S1-2009S1)
Panel a: Exports
Services Goods
Period 2008S1 2009S1 % Change 2008S1 2009S1 % Change
Total 21,757 21,075 -3.13% 99,534 72,853 -26.81%
Extensive Margins:
Firms 2,107 2,107 - 12,964 12,964 -
Countries 11.41 11.37 -0.33% 8.58 8.46 -1.41%
Products 1.52 1.55 2.00% 3.72 3.79 1.83%
Intensive Margin:
Average Sales 0.60 0.57 -4.72% 0.24 0.18 -27.09%
Note: This table presents the decomposition of the growth rate of Belgian exports between the first
six months of 2008 and the first six months of 2009 into the extensive margin (average number of
export markets per firm and average number of products per market-firm) and the intensive margin
(average exports per firm, market and product). The total and the intensive margins are expressed
in millions of Euros, the extensive margins in units.
case t = {2008S1, 2009S1}), of trade type k (where k = {Services,Goods}),
Xkt , into the number of firms ft, the average number of markets served per
firm c¯t, the average number of exported products per market-firm p¯t, and the145
average exports per firm-market-product x¯t: X
k
t = f
k ∗ c¯kt ∗ p¯kt ∗ x¯kt . By taking
the ratio between the first six months of 2008 and the first six months of 2009,
the change in total exports, ∆Xk =
Xk2009
Xk2008
, can thus be broken down into the
change in the extensive margins (firms-services-markets) and the change in the
intensive margin (the average exports per firm-market-service):150
∆Xk = ∆fk ∗∆c¯k ∗∆p¯k ∗∆x¯k (1)
Since I focus only on continuing firms, the change in the number of firms, ∆f ,
is equal to one. Looking at Table 1, the change in Belgian exports between
the first six months of 2008 and 2009 is -26.81% for goods and only -3.13% for
services. Even if these decreases differ in quantitative terms, qualitatively they
are both generated almost entirely by a reduction in the quantities exported155
per market and product that is only partially counterbalanced (at least for
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Table 2: Change in the Margins of Belgian Exports (2008S1-2009S1)
Panel a: By Product Type Panel b: By Destination Country
Total Extensive Margins Intensive Total Extensive Margins Intensive
Services: % Change Countries Services Margin Services: % Change Countries Services Margin
Transport Services -12.44 -2.18 3.00 -13.09
Service to non-Residents -0.34 -0.14 1.29 -1.47 EU -4.30 -1.08 1.94 -5.09
Telecommunication Services 11.66 5.13 -1.47 7.80 non-EU -1.14 0.50 2.17 -3.73
Construction Services -0.79 -2.77 -0.82 2.87 OECD -1.05 -0.84 1.74 -1.92
Financial and Insurance Services 21.49 1.59 0.26 19.27 non-OECD -14.85 -0.09 2.80 -17.09
Business Services 4.90 -0.23 2.11 2.97
Goods: Goods:
Durable and Capital Goods -29.75 -1.50 2.03 -30.02 EU -26.73 -3.15 1.54 -25.50
Consumable Goods -7.74 0.17 0.36 -8.22 non-EU -27.27 -0.76 4.14 -29.63
Energy -44.47 -3.94 0.04 -42.22 OECD -26.64 -1.92 2.09 -26.74
Other -25.51 -1.84 0.28 -24.33 non-OECD -27.75 -0.59 1.58 -28.45
Panel c: By Ownership and Multinational Status Panel d: By Firm Characteristics
Total Extensive Margins Intensive Total Extensive Margins Intensive
Services: % Change Countries Services Margin Services: % Change Countries Services Margin
MNE 7.38 0.63 2.36 4.24 Big -0.27 -0.38 2.60 -2.42
non-MNE -8.54 -0.60 1.80 -8.54 Small -22.65 -1.13 -0.57 -21.32
Foreign Owned 3.17 0.86 3.89 -1.53 Financially exposed -1.32 0.25 0.97 -2.51
Non-Foreign Owned -8.64 -0.88 0.89 -8.64 Financially non-exposed -3.07 -0.74 3.20 -5.37
Panel b: Goods Goods:
MNE -29.77 -1.28 2.44 -30.55 Big -27.08 -1.85 2.85 -27.76
non-MNE -25.04 -1.44 1.65 -25.19 Small -23.98 -0.48 1.28 -24.58
Foreign Owned -30.32 -2.04 4.53 -31.96 Financially exposed -29.68 -1.94 1.84 -29.58
Non-Foreign Owned -22.98 -1.27 0.99 -22.75 Financially non-exposed -23.82 -0.90 3.36 -25.63
Note: This table presents the decomposition of the growth rate of Belgian exports between the first six months of 2008 and the first six months of 2009 by type of product
(panel a), destination country (panel b), ownership status (panel c), and firm characteristics (panel d). The total and the intensive margins are expressed in millions of Euros,
the extensive margins in units.
services) by an increase in the average number of products. Both for goods and
services trade, Belgian firms did not significantly leave destination markets: they
decreased by only -0.33% for services and -1.41% for goods. They stepped up
the average number of products provided per destination country: an increase160
by 2% for services and 1.83% for goods.18 They cut their average exports per
market-product significantly with a decline of -4.72% for services and a drop of
-27.09% for goods. The huge difference in the reaction of the average quantities
exported per market and product suggests that the intensive margin is the key
to understanding the difference in the reactions of services and goods trade.165
By dividing Belgian exports into the different product categories, a great
heterogeneity across products, both for services and goods, appears in panel a of
18For goods exports, I use the HS4 classification. Using a more aggregate classification
marginally decreases the contribution of the average number of products and increases that
of the intensive margin.
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Table 2. Services related to transport experienced a drop commensurate to that
of goods. On the other hand, business, financial and telecommunication services,
which represent more than 50% of Belgian exports, continued their sustained170
growth. For goods exports, all product categories experienced a decline, yet
the bulk of the collapse came from durable and capital goods. By decomposing
Belgian exports into EU and non-EU and OECD and non-OECD in panel b of
Table 2, a mixed country pattern emerges. Non-EU and extra-OECD services
exports experienced a bigger drop than EU and OECD ones. This is because175
most of the extra-OECD trade is represented by transport services, which is the
only service category that collapsed. For goods exports on the other hand, the
fall is similar across the different regions.
To discern differences across firms, in panel c of Table 2 I divide exports
following their multinational and foreign ownership status. For services, non-180
multinational and non foreign-owned firms were hit by the crisis, while multi-
national and foreign-owned firms registered positive figures. However, these
decreases are much smaller than those for goods, for which there is no hetero-
geneity following the multinational and foreign ownership status. Finally, we
define in panel d a firm as big if its full-time equivalent employment is higher185
than the median exporter in the same industry, and as financially exposed if its
external financial dependency is higher than the median exporter in the same
industry. Based on this distinction, we observe that there is no heterogeneity
for firms exporting goods, while small firms exporting services suffered more
from the crisis than big ones. This result is partially driven by the fact that the190
only service category that experienced a drop, transport services, includes many
small firms. In general, these results highlight a more pronounced heterogeneous
response of services during the crisis.
Summing up the descriptive evidence on the crisis in Belgium, it seems that
services exports did not suffer as much as goods exports. Most of the adjustment195
was due to a decrease in the intensive margin which was more important for
goods than for services. By contrast, the role of the extensive margin was less
important, with both service and goods exporters reducing the number of des-
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tinations slightly and increasing the number of products per destination. In the
case of goods, the fall was evenly spread geographically, while for services only200
non-OECD exports suffered. Moreover, we observe an important heterogeneity
when looking at the different product types. In particular, transport services
dropped similarly to trade in goods, while professional, financial and telecom-
munication services continued to grow at a rapid pace. For trade in goods,
the decrease was mostly due to a reduction in durable and capital goods, while205
consumable goods declined more smoothly. Finally, heterogeneity played a role
depending on ownership and multinational status, size, and financial situation
for services exports, but not for goods exports.
4. Regression Analysis
To understand which factors could lead to a different response for services, I210
use a difference-in-difference approach similar to Behrens et al. (2011), in which
the change in the logged exports to a particular market c, of a particular product
p, by a Belgian firm f between the first six months of 2007 and 2008, and the first
six months of 2008 and 2009, ∆Xkfcpt = logX
k
fcp t+1−logXkfcpt, is regressed, sep-
arately for goods and services (remember that k = {Services,Goods}), against215
the treatment dummy Tt that takes value one for the 2008-2009 period; a vector
containing our covariate of interest, GDP growth, together with other controls
at the firm, country and product level: Zkfcpt, and the interaction of this vector
with the treatment dummy, Zkfcpt ∗ Tt.
∆Xkfcpt = α+ β
′
0Tt + β
′
1Z
k
fcpt + β
′
2Z
k
fcpt ∗ Tt + kfcpt (2)
In this specification, β′0 represents the treatment-specific effect, β
′
1 the contri-220
bution of GDP growth and the other covariates in normal times, and β′2 the
contribution of the same variables during the crisis. The identifying assump-
tion, in the absence of a true control group (which would be represented by
firms that were not exposed to the crisis), is based on the assumption that the
treatment had differential effects on firms depending on covariates. The main225
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variable of interest is the GDP growth of destination countries. While not being
the perfect variable for capturing the income variation, it can proxy the over-
all demand conditions in all the export markets present in the dataset. With
respect to the other control variables, it is necessary to consider which other fac-
tors might have led services to react differently from goods during the crisis. On230
the supply side, Chor & Manova (2012), Ahn et al. (2011), Auboin (2009) and
Amiti & Weinstein (2011) identify the severe credit crunch as another element
that made the trade collapse worse. Banks reduced the availability of external
capital for exporters, thus driving down aggregate trade volumes. To the extent
that service exporters rely less on external trade capital, this can be a further235
reason why services exports did not fall.19 To control for the possible effects of
credit constraints I use: the external financial dependence, the share of debts
over liabilities, the share of long-term debts, and the share of financial debts.
The external financial dependence captures the degree to which investments are
not covered by internal resources, capturing the need for external funding to get240
liquidity. The share of debts over liabilities indicates the importance of debts in
relation to overall liabilities. The share of long-term debts measures the leverage
of the firm and so the degree to which the firm is free to use its liquidity. The
idea is that the higher the share of short-term debts, the lower the freedom to
use the liquidity. The share of financial debts controls for how much firms rely245
on financial debts rather than on commercial ones.
19First, this can be related to the fact that many services can be traded over the internet,
thus reducing the need for external finance to make the necessary investments to be able
to export (Borchert & Mattoo, 2009). Second, payments are faster for services: production
and consumption often coincide (this is especially true for modes 2, 3 and 4 defined in the
GATS) and the risk of shipping delays are very low. As a result, the working capital needed to
support the firm from production to delivery is lower. Moreover, this lack of payment delays
lowers the need of export finance insurance. Third, service exporters might not be able to ask
for external trade capital and may be used to work without it. This is because services are
intangible and highly customized. Thus, they have little value outside the seller-buyer link
and they can hardly be used as collateral.
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At the same time, Altomonte et al. (2012) and Bems et al. (2011) observe
that the international nature of global value chains makes downstream demand
shocks propagate through them with magnified upstream volatility due to in-
ventory adjustments. Since services are intangible and thus not storable, they250
might have suffered less from the inventory adjustment process and from the
disruption of global value chains. To control for this, I use the share of interme-
diates, the share of exports over sales, the share of imports over intermediates,
the importance of imports and exports over total turnover and the importance
of stocks. All these measures provide evidence of the degree to which firms are255
oriented towards foreign markets for their sales and how much they rely on ex-
ternal sources for their inputs. Finally, service exporters might differ from goods
exporters in various dimensions (size, productivity, multinational status, etc.)
and that may lead to a different reaction of service trade to the same shock. To
capture this heterogeneity, I use the multinational and foreign-ownership sta-260
tus, the productivity and the size of the firm. These variables should shed some
light on the role that firm characteristics played for services and goods exports.
Table 3 provides a detailed explanation of the construction and the sources of
all the variables used.
In order to avoid issues related to multicollinearity that might arise from265
the use of many firm-level variables together, I perform a principal component
analysis.20 More specifically, I collapse all the variables pertaining to the same
channel into a synthetic standardized variable capturing their maximum com-
mon variability. Besides the aforementioned variables, I use regional dummies
to control for regional trends, the exchange rates to control for the strategic270
use of currencies and industry dummies to control for industry-level dynam-
ics.Since I do not have product characteristics that are comparable across goods
and services, I use service or product dummies to control for heterogeneous re-
20The results for the specification with the firm-level variables not condensed in the principal
component analysis is available in Table 3 of the Online Appendix.
15
Table 3: Description of the Variables
Variable Name Description Source
Trade Variables:
Export of Services 2007-2010 monthly exports of services by firm, service, country 1
Export of Goods 2007-2010 monthly exports of goods by firm, service, country 2
Heterogeneity:
Size Log of firm size, measured in terms of full-time equivalent employment 3
Productivity Log of Value added per worker 3
FOR Dummy indicating foreign ownership 4
MNE Dummy indicating a multinational firm 4
Global Value Chains:
Share of Intermediates Share of intermediates over turnover 3
Share of Exports on Sales Share of exports over turnover 3
Share of Imports on Intermediates Share of imports over intermediates 3
Value Added Chain Exports times imports over turnover 3
Stocks Importance Ratio of stock over turnover 3
Credit Constraints:
External Financial Dependence Investments minus operating profits over investments 3
Share of Debts over Liabilities Ratio of debts over total liabilities 3
Share of Long-Term Debts Share of debts due after one year 3
Share of Financial Debts Share of financial debt 3
Income:
GDP Growth Average annual growth rate of GDP 5
Domestic absorption Change in log households spending by product type 6
(Durables, Consumables, Services)
Further Controls:
Nace codes NACE rev 1.1 2-digit industry dummies 7
OECD but non-EU Dummy for countries belonging to the OECD (in 2008) but not to the EU 8
non-OECD non-EU Dummy for countries belonging neither to the OECD nor to the EU 8
Exchange rate change % change in the daily exchange rate with the euro between at the 1st 9
of April of each year
Note: 1= NBB Trade in Services Dataset; 2=NBB Trade in Goods Dataset; 3= NBB Business Registry; 4= NBB Survey of Foreign
Direct Investments; 5= IMF World Economic Outlook; 6=OECD Database; 7= NBB Crossroads Bank; 8= OECD and European
Commission; 9= European Central Bank.
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Table 4: The Role of GDP Growth: Regression on Continuing Firm-Country-Service Triplets
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Goods Services Durable Goods Consumable Goods
β1 β2 β1 β2 β1 β2 β1 β2
GDP Growth 1.1965a 1.4854b 2.0229 -1.3520 1.1359c 1.7470b 1.7523b 0.8069
(0.458) (0.666) (1.839) (2.495) (0.584) (0.803) (0.579) (0.780)
Heterogeneity 0.0278b -0.0388b 0.0154 -0.0175 0.0281b -0.0293c 0.0185 -0.0436
(0.013) (0.015) (0.067) (0.096) (0.013) (0.015) (0.020) (0.028)
Global Value Chains 0.1266 -0.1661 -0.0909b 0.2732a 0.1326 -0.1704 0.1756 -0.1298
(0.106) (0.171) (0.040) (0.068) (0.110) (0.198) (0.130) (0.163)
Credit Constraints 0.0034 -0.0147 -0.0460 0.0505 0.0015 -0.0206 0.0202 -0.0182
(0.010) (0.014) (0.046) (0.075) (0.010) (0.016) (0.013) (0.022)
Constant -0.0107 -0.2017 -0.2285a 0.0697
(0.043) (0.123) (0.057) (0.267)
Obs. 428,002 15,073 287,130 107,440
R2 0.0096 0.0442 0.0107 0.0077
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Note: This table presents the estimated coefficients for GDP growth. β1 refers to the estimated effects in normal time and β2
refers to the estimated effects of the same variables during the crisis. All regressions contain as controls: product/service, industry
and regional dummies as well as exchange rate changes. Multi-level clustered standard errors in parentheses (at the firm, product
and country level). a p<0.01, bp<0.05, c p<0.1.
sponses across different products.21 Since the independent variables vary at a
more aggregate level than the dependent variable, I use the multi-level cluster-275
ing procedure developed by Cameron et al. (2011) and cluster standard errors in
the three relevant dimensions used in the analysis: firm, product and country.22
Finally, to alleviate endogeneity issues for the firm-level variables, I use balance
sheet data from 2007 only and trade data from 2006 to compute export and
import to turnover ratios.280
21In order to have a similar level of disaggregation between services and goods, I use the
HS classification at the 2-digit level. It is important to notice that one firm can have only one
industry code but can export multiple products or services. So, the industry dummy variation
cannot be absorbed by the product or service dummies.
22The procedure involves the computation of the standard errors clustered at each level
of aggregation (in our case firm, country, product, firm-country, firm-product and country-
product). These one-way clustered variance matrices are combined together and to the re-
sulting matrix is subtracted the variance matrix that clusters all the dimensions together
(firm-country-product in our case).
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Column (1) of Table 4 shows the results for goods exports. Both the het-
erogeneity and GDP growth variables show significant coefficients for both the
normal period (β1) and the crisis period (β2), while the global value chain and
the financial constraints do not. The positive coefficient of β1 and the negative
one of β2 for the heterogeneity covariate mean that bigger, more productive,285
foreign-owned or multinational firms are those, in terms of export growth, which
tend to grow the most during normal times and suffered the least during the
crisis. Looking at the income variation, the growth of goods exports follows
GDP growth in destination countries in normal times: a one percent increase
in GDP growth is associated with a 1.2% increase in exports. This effect is290
magnified during crises: a one percent decrease in GDP growth is associated
with a 2.68% decrease in export values.23
The insignificant coefficients for the global value chains and the financial con-
straints covariates suggest that they did not play a significant role during the
crisis. However, it is also possible that the heterogeneity principal component295
is capturing part of that variation. For instance, it is known that multination-
als can compensate for financial market imperfections (Manova et al., 2015).
Therefore, the multinational status might capture part of the financial con-
straint variation. At the same time, while I use standard measures suggested by
the literature,24 the debate on which variable should be used to capture credit300
constraints is still open. The main issue is that these variables might capture
both demand and supply components, thus raising potential endogeneity con-
cerns.
Switching to column (2) of Table 4, we observe that GDP growth did not
play a part for trade in services. The most important factor explaining the fall305
for trade in goods (Behrens et al., 2011) does not have any effect on the growth
23This is simply given by the sum of the estimated coefficient for normal times, 1.1965 and
the coefficient for crisis times, 1.4845.
24See for example Manova & Yu (2012), Whited (1992), Fazzari & Petersen (1993), Green-
away et al. (2007), and Ding et al. (2013)
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of trade in services both in normal times and crisis times. So, the evolution
of services exports over time does not seem to be related to changes in the
aggregate income in destination markets.25 At the same time, the crisis did not
have heterogeneous effects based on size, productivity and foreign ownership or310
multinational status for service exporters, and credit constraints did not affect
service exporters. The only significant coefficient concerns the global value chain
variable: firms which were more involved in foreign markets were those growing
the least during normal times, but the crisis reversed this trend.
Behrens et al. (2011), Bricongne et al. (2012), Eaton et al. (2015) and315
Levchenko et al. (2010) show that a compositional effect led trade in goods
to fall more than GDP: durable goods, which constitute a large share of inter-
national trade but only a small share of domestic spending, collapsed more than
consumables and services, thus having little effect on GDP but a huge one on
exports. If the demand for services did not suffer from the decrease in income,320
the same compositional effect may also explain the resistance of service trade.
The results in Table 4 seem to be in line with this hypothesis: income variations
in destination countries had little effect on services exports, while they had a
magnified effect on trade in goods during the crisis. In order to test this hy-
pothesis more finely, I proceed in two steps. In the first, I divide total exports325
into durable and consumable exports and check what effect GDP growth has on
them. Here, GDP growth should have a stronger effect on durable and capital
goods than on consumable goods. In the second step, I use a measure of do-
mestic absorption by product or service type.26 If the compositional argument
is valid, the exports of durables, consumables and services should be correlated330
25Please note that this result does not preclude the levels of services exports to be signif-
icantly correlated with the levels of GDP in destination countries, for example, in a gravity
setting. Moreover, I tested for the presence of second- and third-order non-linearities and I
did not find any significant result.
26See Table 3 for the definition and the source of this variable. Please note that one
limitation of this analysis is that I only have the information on the domestic absorption by
product type for OECD destinations.
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Table 5: Domestic Absorption: Regression on Continuing Firm-Country-Service Triplets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Goods Services Durable Goods Consumable Goods Services
β1 β2 β1 β2 β1 β2 β1 β2 β1 β2
Domestic Absorption 1.0421a 0.8242b 3.5366b -1.9805
(0.307) (0.396) (1.497) (1.783)
Durables Absorption 0.4127a 0.2832
(0.156) (0.187)
Consumables Absorption 0.0752 -0.0000
(0.864) (0.000)
Services Absorption 3.6837b -2.2452
(1.823) (2.065)
Heterogeneity 0.0275b -0.0396b -0.0039 0.0013 0.0233c -0.0194 0.0297 -0.0662b 0.0046 0.0022
(0.014) (0.016) (0.079) (0.114) (0.014) (0.016) (0.021) (0.032) (0.079) (0.113)
Global Value Chains 0.1169 -0.1294 -0.0505 0.2901b 0.1291 -0.1381 0.1771 -0.1867 -0.0325 0.2489c
(0.108) (0.151) (0.071) (0.134) (0.113) (0.180) (0.145) (0.166) (0.069) (0.129)
Credit Constraints 0.0110 -0.0155 -0.0186 0.0128 0.0115 -0.0223 0.0216 -0.0183 -0.0168 0.0024
(0.010) (0.014) (0.050) (0.078) (0.010) (0.016) (0.015) (0.026) (0.051) (0.082)
Constant -0.0200 -0.2069 -0.0314 -0.1905c -0.1879
(0.044) (0.142) (0.050) (0.113) (0.154)
Obs. 364,339 11,189 232,832 91,135 10,529
R2 0.0098 0.0430 0.0113 0.0075 0.0411
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Note: This table presents the estimated coefficients for the different variables capturing domestic absorption. β1 refers to the estimated effect in normal times
and β2 refers to the estimated effect of the same variables during the crisis. All regressions contain as controls: product/service, industry and regional dummies
as well as exchange rate changes. Multi-level clustered standard errors in parentheses (at the firm, product and country level). a p<0.01, bp<0.05, c p<0.1.
with their corresponding absorption in the destination countries27 during nor-
mal time, but no abnormal reaction during the crisis should be observed. In this
case, the decrease in the demand for durables would explain the abnormal fall
in goods exports during the crisis and the stability of service absorption would
explain the spectacular resilience of trade in services.335
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 4 present the results when splitting the sample
into the exports of durable and consumable goods. Most of the over-reaction of
goods trade with respect to GDP variations is clearly due to the fall of durable
goods, while consumable goods did not have any abnormal reaction during the
crisis. This is a first clue that the compositional effect is in place. In columns (1)340
and (2) of Table 5, I run the same regression as in columns (1) and (2) of Table
4 using the growth in overall domestic absorption instead of the GDP growth.
27I.e. the exports of durable goods should be correlated with spending on durables in
destination countries.
20
This is a test to check whether the behavior of domestic spending mimics that
of GDP growth. The results confirm the over-reaction of trade in goods during
the crisis and thus the validity of domestic absorption as a proxy for income345
changes, despite its limited geographical coverage.28 Finally, in columns (3),
(4) and (5) of Table 5, the export in durables, consumables and services are
related to their respective domestic absorption. As expected, none of them is
significantly correlated with their corresponding change in domestic absorption
during the crisis (β2 is never significant). Therefore, the compositional argument350
explains both the service resilience and the over-reaction of trade in goods: the
demand for durables - which represent most of the export values - collapsed
during the crisis, while that of services and consumables - which constitute
most of the domestic income - stayed relatively high. Accordingly, while trade
in goods collapsed, trade in services remained relatively stable.355
5. Investigating Mechanisms
The previous section highlighted the different impact that GDP growth had
on services and goods during the crisis. In this section, I test its significance and
quantify the economic magnitude. To do so, services exports must be compared
with goods exports and thus service exporters with goods exporters. I follow360
two complementary strategies. In the first one, I consider only firms that export
both services and goods, or “bi-exporters”. In the second one, I focus solely on
firms that export only services or goods, or “mono-exporters”, and for every
service exporter I find the closest goods exporter by applying propensity score
matching.29 The advantage of using the first method is that it is like performing365
28Please note that now trade in services is positively correlated with variations in domestic
absorption, highlighting the fact that this covariate might be more appropriate for proxying
service demand in destination countries during normal times.
29I present the results using Mahalanobis Matching (with replacement) in which firms are
matched in terms of: size, productivity, capital intensity, average wage, multinational and
foreign ownership status. Using other matching functions like Nearest Neighbor or Kernel
Matching does not change the results. Table 4 of the Online Appendix reports the statistics
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a “perfect matching” and so, any difference across goods and services related
to both the observable and unobservable components of supply can be ruled
out. The advantage of the second one is that the results are not influenced by
interactions across goods and services within the same firm. Moreover, the first
can provide evidence on the within-firm effects of GDP growth in destination370
countries and the second complements by providing the across-firm perspective.
With respect to the previous analysis, I have to drop the product dimension
since one cannot determine which good should be matched with a particular
service and vice-versa. Therefore, the unit of analysis is represented by the
change in exports of firm f in country c at time t, ∆Xfct. The interaction375
between a dummy indicating the service flow Sf , the treatment dummy for the
crisis Tt and GDP growth will provide evidence on the differential impact of
the income shock on services exports with respect to goods exports during the
crisis. This triple-difference strategy can be expressed analytically as:
∆Xfct = α+ β
′
0Tt + β
′
1GDPct + β
′
2GDPct ∗ Tt + γ′0Sf + γ′1Sf ∗ Tt
+γ′2Sf ∗GDPct + γ′3Sf ∗GDPct ∗ Tt + fct (3)
where β′0, β
′
1 and β
′
2 have the same interpretation as the difference-in-difference380
strategy used before. γ′0 is the specific treatment effect controlling for differences
across goods and services. γ′1 captures the different responses across goods and
services during the crisis. γ′2 controls for specific differences in the effect of
GDP growth across goods and services. The coefficient of interest, γ′3, captures
the differential effect of GDP growth on services exports with respect to goods385
exports during the crisis. Since the GDP growth variable is at the country level,
standard errors are clustered accordingly. Moreover, to control for possible firm-
level shocks, I use firm-year dummies. Looking at the estimated coefficient of
γ′3 in the first column of Table 6 (panel a), the reaction of services exports
to the income shock was significantly different from that of goods exports. In390
and differences for the two groups.
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Table 6: Investigating Mechanisms: Regression on Continuing Firm-Countries, GDP Growth
Panel a: Bi-Exporters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
All Durables Consumables Business Transport Services to Telecomm. Construction Financial Other OECD non-OECD
Services Services Non Residents Services Services Services Services
Sf ∗GDPct ∗ Tt -5.4887b -5.1373a -5.0003 -9.5013b -6.2693a -25.4864 4.3487 13.1403 4.3461 -4.1258 -12.5599a -4.7423
(2.771) (1.881) (3.514) (4.025) (2.219) (15.434) (5.173) (12.030) (15.253) (8.583) (3.740) (3.817)
Obs. 12,846 11,996 8,962 7,183 6,228 481 768 660 1,065 1,735 9,902 6,513
R2 0.0831 0.0901 0.1041 0.0782 0.1063 0.1823 0.1290 0.1239 0.1056 0.0968 0.0844 0.1150
Panel b: Matched Mono Exporters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
All Durables Consumables Business Transport Services to Telecomm. Construction Financial Other OECD non-OECD
Services Services Non Residents Services Services Services Services
Sf ∗GDPct ∗ Tt -3.7797b -4.4216b -2.1773 -11.8501b -4.8019 29.9332c -63.4042c -2.8044 -0.3856 -5.3368a -3.5667b -2.0703
(1.549) (1.865) (1.814) (4.923) (3.212) (17.234) (34.659) (4.419) (2.495) (1.896) (1.636) (4.042)
Obs. 27,208 23,645 16,922 11,908 8,550 7,677 9,431 7,664 8,234 7,772 19,526 15,176
R2 0.0945 0.1016 0.1084 0.0805 0.0767 0.1013 0.0588 0.0879 0.0506 0.1128 0.1131 0.1001
Note: This table reports the estimated coefficients for γGDP Growth3 from equation (3) for firms that trade both goods and services (Bi-Exporters) and for matched firms exporting either goods or
services (Mono-Exporters). All regressions include firm-year dummies. Clustered standard errors in parentheses (at the country level). a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1.
particular, to a one percent decline in GDP growth, services exports decrease on
average 5.5% less than goods exports. By using the “matched” mono-exporters,
and performing the same analysis, the results are the same qualitatively and
are also very similar in quantitative terms (first column of Table 6, panel b).
Therefore, the different reaction of services holds both within and across firms395
and it is not influenced by the fact that bi-exporters might represent a particular
category of exporters.
To quantify the economic importance of GDP growth during the 2008-2009
collapse for trade in goods, I compare the fall of trade in goods predicted by the
previous model with the fall predicted assuming goods exports having the same400
elasticity as services. This is simply done by comparing the predicted exports
when the indicator variable Sf indicates services and when it indicates goods
instead. In this hypothetical case, I find that the fall for goods would have been
about half of what was observed during the 2008-2009 crisis. Therefore, the
different elasticity of goods and services trade with respect to negative income405
variations in partner countries played a major role for both the fall of trade in
goods and for the resilience of services.
In the descriptive part of the paper, we observed that most of the decline in
the exports of goods was accounted for by durable and capital goods. At the
same time, while transport services were collapsing as much as goods, financial,410
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telecommunication and business services did not suffer at all during the crisis.
To check whether the same patterns can be observed in a regression setting
and to refine the results, I divide the exports of goods and services into the
different product categories and I apply the same type of analysis for each of
them. I divide goods exports into exports of durable goods and exports of415
consumable goods. The results in columns (2) and (3) of Table 6 indicate that
the resilience of services is significant only with respect to durable goods. In
columns (4)-(10) of Table 6, the regressions are carried out across different
service categories. As can be seen from the magnitude and significance of the
coefficients, most of the effect is accounted for by business services.30 Therefore,420
services look more similar to consumables than to durable goods and services like
management, legal, accounting and marketing continued to be purchased despite
the negative economic situation. This evidence reinforces the argument that
services represent non-discretionary components of the production process and
their continuous sourcing is vital for the production of final products (Johnson,425
2014). Column (9) shows that the same effect is not present for financial services,
which is the category that experienced the biggest increase in trade in services
during the crisis. Two facts can explain this result. First, the financial sector
is highly concentrated, with few firms driving aggregate figures. Thus, even if
few financial firms enjoyed higher exports during the crisis, the data tell us that430
many others were suffering. Second, trade in goods collapsed less for firms which
also exported financial services. Therefore, there might not be enough variation
to capture the same effect for bi-exporters of financial services. Finally, when
distinguishing between OECD and non-OECD exports in columns (11)-(12) of
Table 6, the service resilience seems to be driven by OECD destination markets435
only. This result should be interpreted carefully because most Belgian exports
30One exception is the significant coefficient of transport services for bi-exporters. This is
because for bi-exporters trade in goods collapsed more than transport services. One possible
explanation is that these exporters had to comply with goods transport even if the values
(and so the quantities) traded decreased.
24
Table 7: Investigating Mechanisms: Regression on Continuing Firm-Countries, Domestic Ab-
sorption
Panel a: Bi-Exporters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
All Durables Consumables Business Transport Services to Telecomm. Construction Financial Other
Services Services Non Residents Services Services Services Services
Sf ∗Dom.Abs.ct ∗ Tt -4.6093c -4.0999b -1.4814 -8.2366a -2.5431 -8.1924 5.8375 -13.7093 -6.3247 13.0042
(2.379) (1.768) (2.482) (2.896) (2.991) (11.832) (4.086) (9.393) (6.205) (10.728)
Obs. 10,094 9,428 7,176 6,031 4,697 448 557 561 947 1,541
R2 0.0874 0.1000 0.1149 0.0854 0.1072 0.1835 0.1439 0.1505 0.1275 0.0992
Panel b: Matched Mono Exporters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
All Durables Consumables Business Transport Services to Telecomm. Construction Financial Other
Services Services Non Residents Services Services Services Services
Sf ∗Dom.Abs.ct ∗ T -2.7915b -3.2137c -4.2041b -3.6533c -3.7474 114.1684 1.8508 84.0136c -4.2233 26.0836
(1.190) (1.837) (1.878) (2.133) (4.469) (70.176) (2.482) (43.557) (4.604) (17.145)
Obs. 19,574 16,929 12,372 9,303 6,552 6,040 6,486 6,030 6,421 6,136
R2 0.1157 0.1228 0.1297 0.0948 0.0939 0.0810 0.0831 0.0779 0.0823 0.0909
Note: This table reports the estimated coefficients for γDom.Absorption3 for firms that trade both goods and services (Bi-Exporters) and for matched firms exporting either
goods or services (Mono-Exporters). All regressions include firm-year dummies. Clustered standard errors in parentheses (at the country level). a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1.
go to OECD countries (about 70%) and most of the trade in services outside
the OECD is represented by transport services. Again, the variation might not
be enough to identify the same effect also in non-OECD export markets.
5.1. Robustness Checks and Further Results440
To check the robustness of the results, I perform the same analysis as in Table
6 using the measure of domestic absorption in destination countries instead of
GDP growth. Even if the sample size is reduced to OECD countries only, all the
results are confirmed: in Table 7 the domestic absorption variable is negative
and significant for the whole sample (column 1), for durable goods (column445
2) and for business services (column 4).31 Moreover, even the magnitudes are
comparable to those of Table 6. Therefore, even using a different variable to
proxy income the variation in destination countries, results remain the same.
Using a similar empirical strategy, it is possible to check whether credit
constraints played a different role for services with respect to goods during the
31The only exception is in the category of consumable goods for which the coefficient is
significant for mono-exporters.
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crisis. Analytically, the empirical specification is very similar to (3):
∆Xfct = α+ β
′
0Tt + β
′
1Finf + β
′
2Finf ∗ Tt + γ′0Sf + γ′1Sf ∗ Tt
+γ′2Sf ∗ Finf + γ′3Sf ∗ Finf ∗ Tt + fct (4)
where Finf denotes the principal component variable for credit constraints.
The only differences are that standard errors are clustered at the firm level450
and country-year dummies are used to control for demand shocks in partner
countries. Table 8 shows the results for credit constraints. In most specifica-
tions, γ′3 is not significant, so, there is no strong evidence supporting a different
role of credit constraints for services exports relative to goods exports during
the crisis. This result holds both for bi-exporters and mono-exporters, differ-455
entiating goods and services into their different categories and interacting the
financial constraint variable with the GDP growth variable. Moreover, it holds
even when splitting the principal component into the different variables com-
posing it. Thus, to the extent that the variables used are able to capture the
credit constraints faced by exporters, they did not play a significant part to460
explain the different reaction of services exports. Finally, it is also possible
to test whether firm-characteristics and global value chains had differential ef-
fects for services with respect to goods exports using the same strategy used
for credit constraints. The results reported in Tables 5 and 6 of the online ap-
pendix suggest that there is no significant effect both looking at bi-exporters and465
mono-exporters. Therefore, supply-side factors such as credit constraints, global
value chains or heterogeneity were not central forces to explain the resilience of
services.
6. Conclusions
This paper shows that exports of services did not suffer from the 2008-2009470
crisis because they are more immune to short-term negative income shocks than
goods exports. Using exports at the firm-product-destination level for Belgium,
I find that the elasticity of services with respect to GDP growth in destination
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Table 8: Investigating Mechanisms:: Regression on Continuing Firm-Countries, Credit Con-
straints
Panel a: Bi-Exporters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
All Durables Consumables Business Transport Services to Telecomm. Construction Financial Other OECD non-OECD
Services Services Non Residents Services Services Services Services
Sf ∗ Finf ∗ Tt 0.4557 0.0938 0.2772 0.6000 0.1076 2.7639 -0.6523 1.2524 1.7447b 0.5249 0.0108 0.3557b
(0.340) (0.408) (0.378) (0.385) (0.232) (1.719) (1.201) (1.099) (0.738) (0.762) (0.095) (0.156)
Obs. 18,790 12,127 13,817 10,360 9,006 699 1,073 1,201 1,708 2,536 9,283 6,146
R2 0.0313 0.0347 0.0327 0.0372 0.0597 0.2547 0.1940 0.1788 0.1834 0.1169 0.0119 0.0728
Panel b: Matched Mono Exporters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
All Durables Consumables Business Transport Services to Telecomm. Construction Financial Other OECD non-OECD
Services Services Non Residents Services Services Services Services
Sf ∗ Finf ∗ Tt 0.0275 -0.0031 0.1837 -0.0190 0.1138 -4.1627 -0.0056 -0.7648 -0.2652 0.9249 -0.1162b 0.0592
(0.123) (0.128) (0.183) (0.246) (0.321) (9.027) (0.280) (2.102) (1.637) (2.144) (0.048) (0.073)
Obs. 26,317 13,535 19,235 7,182 12,503 1,043 3,079 1,933 2,895 2,090 18,337 14,861
R2 0.0331 0.0180 0.0413 0.0699 0.0644 0.3433 0.2400 0.2421 0.1614 0.1779 0.0038 0.0167
Note: This table reports the estimated coefficients for γFIN3 for firms that trade both goods and services (Bi-Exporters) and for matched firms exporting either goods or services (Mono-Exporters). All regressions
include country-year dummies. Clustered standard errors in parentheses (at the firm level). a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1.
countries during the crisis was significantly different from that of goods. In
particular, the negative income shock in partner countries affected exports of475
goods but not exports of services. This peculiar resilience of trade in services is
especially strong with respect to the export of durable goods and it is mostly
accounted for by the business services. This difference is economically sizable:
if goods exports had had the same elasticity to GDP growth as services, their
fall during the 2008-2009 collapse would have been only half what was observed.480
Acknowledgments
Financial help under the Globalisation Investment and Trade in Services
(GIST) project, funded by the EU 7th Framework Programme (ITN-2008-
211429), is gratefully acknowledged. This work was carried out while I was
a Ph.D. student at IRES, Univeriste´ catholique de Louvain and an intern at the485
National Bank of Belgium, I thank them for the hospitality and the support
provided. All views expressed in this paper, as well as errors, are my own and
do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bank of Belgium. This pa-
per has greatly benefited from the suggestions and comments of Michel Beine,
Holger Breinlich, Anca Cristea, Frederic Docquier, Chiara Farronato, Brad-490
27
ford Jensen, Martina Lawless, Kalina Manova, Anna Maria Mayda, Florian
Mayneris, Giordano Mion, Lindsay Oldenski, Mathieu Parenti, Alberto Russo,
Ilke Van Beveren, the editor, Daniel Trefler, two anonymous referees and the
participants at the many conferences and seminars I have attended.
References495
Ahn, J., Amiti, M., & Weinstein, D. E. (2011). Trade Finance and the Great
Trade Collapse. American Economic Review , 101 , 298–302.
Altomonte, C., Mauro, F. D., Ottaviano, G. I. P., Rungi, A., & Vicard, V.
(2012). Global Value Chains During the Great Trade Collapse: A Bullwhip
Effect? . CEP Discussion Papers dp1131 Centre for Economic Performance,500
LSE.
Amiti, M., & Weinstein, D. E. (2011). Exports and Financial Shocks. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126 , 1841–1877.
Ariu, A. (2015). Services versus Goods Trade: A Firm-Level Comparison. Re-
view of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), forthcoming .505
Auboin, M. (2009). Restoring Trade Finance: What the G20 Can Do. In The
Collapse of Global Trade, Murky Protectionism, and the Crisis. London, UK:
Richard Edward Baldwin Simon Evenett.
Baldwin, R. E. (2009). The Great Trade Collapse: Causes, Consequences and
Prospects. Technical Report CEPR: London, UK.510
Behrens, K., Corcos, G., & Mion, G. (2011). Trade Crisis? What Trade Crisis?
The Review of Economics and Statistics, 95 , 702–209.
Bems, R., Johnson, R. C., & Yi, K.-M. (2011). Vertical Linkages and the
Collapse of Global Trade. American Economic Review , 101 , 308–12.
Bems, R., Johnson, R. C., & Yi, K.-M. (2013). The Great Trade Collapse.515
Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, 5 , 375–400.
28
Bernard, A. B., Jensen, B. J., Redding, S. J., & Shott, P. K. (2009). The
Margins of US Trade. American Economic Review , 99 , 487–93.
Borchert, I., & Mattoo, A. (2009). The Crisis-Resilience of Services Trade. The
Service Industries Journal , 30 , 2115–2136.520
Breinlich, H., & Criscuolo, C. (2011). International Trade in Services: a Portrait
of Importers and Exporters. Journal of International Economics,, 84 , 188–
206.
Bricongne, J.-C., Fontagne´, L., Gaulier, G., Taglioni, D., & Vicard, V. (2012).
Firms and the Global Crisis: French Exports in the Turmoil. Journal of525
International Economics, 87 , 134 – 146.
Cameron, A. C., Gelbach, J. B., & Miller, D. L. (2011). Robust Inference
with Multiway Clustering. Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 29 ,
238–249.
Chor, D., & Manova, K. (2012). Off the Cliff and Back? Credit Conditions and530
International Trade during the Global Financial Crisis. Journal of Interna-
tional Economics, 87 , 117–133.
Ding, S., Guariglia, A., & Knight, J. (2013). Investment and Financing Con-
straints in China: Does Working Capital Management Make a Difference?
Journal of Banking & Finance, 37 , 1490–1507.535
Eaton, J., Kortum, S., Neiman, B., & Romalis, J. (2015). Trade and the Global
Recession. American Economic Review , forthcoming .
Fazzari, S. M., & Petersen, B. C. (1993). Working Capital and Fixed Investment:
New Evidence on Financing Constraints. RAND Journal of Economics, 24 ,
328–342.540
Federico, S., & Tosti, E. (2012). Exporters and Importers of Services: Firm-
Level Evidence on Italy . Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 877
Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
29
Francois, J. F., & Woerz, J. (2009). Follow the Bouncing Ball – Trade and the
Great Recession Redux. In R. E. Baldwin (Ed.), The Great Trade Collapse:545
Causes, Consequences and Prospects. UK: CEPR.
Freund, C. (2009). The Trade Response to Global Downturns: Historical Evi-
dence. Policy Research Working Paper Series 5015 The World Bank.
Gaulier, G., Mirza, D., & Milet, E. (2011). French Firms in International Trade
in Services. Economie et Statistique, 435 , 125–147.550
Greenaway, D., Guariglia, A., & Kneller, R. (2007). Financial Factors and
Exporting Decisions. Journal of International Economics, 73 , 377–395.
Iacovone, L., & Zavacka, V. (2009). Banking Crises and Exports: Lessons from
the Past . Policy Research Working Paper Series 5016 The World Bank.
Johnson, R. C. (2014). Five Facts about Value-Added Exports and Implications555
for Macroeconomics and Trade Research. Journal of Economic Perspectives,
28 , 119–42.
Kelle, M., & Kleinert, J. (2010). German Firms in Service Trade. Applied Eco-
nomics Quarterly (formerly: Konjunkturpolitik), Duncker & Humblot, Berlin,
56 , 51–72.560
Levchenko, A. A., Lewis, L. T., & Tesar, L. L. (2010). The Collapse of Interna-
tional Trade During the 2008?09 Crisis: In Search of the Smoking Gun. IMF
Economic Review , 58 , 214–253.
Manova, K., Wei, S.-J., & Zhang, Z. (2015). Firm Exports and Multinational
Activity under Credit Constraints. Review of Economics and Statistics, 97 ,565
574–588.
Manova, K., & Yu, Z. (2012). Firms and Credit Constraints along the Value-
Added Chain: Processing Trade in China. NBER Working Papers 18561
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
30
Walter, P., & Dell’mour, R. (2010). Firm-Level Analysis of International Trade570
in Services. IFC Working Papers No.4 , .
Whited, T. M. (1992). Debt, Liquidity Constraints, and Corporate Investment:
Evidence from Panel Data. Journal of Finance, 47 , 1425–60.
31
